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Abstract
This study investigates how the rst childbirth a¤ects the wage processes of women
who are well-established in the labour market. We estimate a exible xed-e¤ects wage
regression model extended by post-childbirth xed e¤ects. We use register data on West
Germany and exploit the expansionary family policy during the late 1980s and 1990s
for identication. On their return to work after childbirth, motherswages drop by 3 to
5.7 per cent per year of leave. We nd negative selection back to full-time work after
childbirth. We discuss policy implications regarding statistical discrimination and results
concerning the family gap.
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I Introduction
Integration and retention of women in the labour market are important issues in political
and economic debate. One particularly important concern is the performance of women with
children in the labour market, with an indicator of their relatively poor performance being
the so-called family gap, the lower hourly wages of women with children compared to those
without.1 To achieve a better familywork balance, parental leave policies have been widely
employed. The main aspect of these schemes is the right to return to a previous position of
employment within a certain period (job-protected maternity leave).
Work interruptions related to giving birth are expected to a¤ect motherswages directly
through changes in the formation of human capital. Identifying the causal e¤ect is challeng-
ing, because women who return to work following childbirth may di¤er from those who do
not. Therefore, comparing the wages of women before and after childbirth may yield biased
estimates. International statistics show that the employment rates of women with young chil-
dren are persistently lower than the overall rates of female employment.2 Hence, the group
that returns to work after giving birth is potentially a non-randomly selected group, and it is
interesting to consider which women from the skill distribution return to work.
In this study, we investigate the e¤ects of the rst childbirth on the wage processes of
women, focusing on the return to human capital before and after childbirth and the e¤ects
of the duration of parental leave. The novelty of our work is that the wage model explicitly
accounts for the non-randomness of the return-to-work decision following childbirth. More
1For an overview of the literature on family gap, see Waldfogel (1998b).
2Employment rates for mothers with children younger than six years of age in 1999 were 61.5 % in the US,
55.8 % in the UK, 51.1 % in Germany and 56.2 % in France. They were higher in Scandinavian countries, but
lower in Southern European countries. See OECD (2001).
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particularly, the standard wage regression model with unobserved heterogeneity is extended to
include post-childbirth xed e¤ects. This is meant to capture changes in motivation, energy and
commitment in connection with childbirth. The post-childbirth e¤ects in the wage regression
are identied through a number of expansions of nationwide maternity leave durations over a
relatively short period.
The empirical analysis is based on a large sample of women who are well-established in
the labour market. Data are extracted from the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) em-
ployment register for West Germany covering the period 19752001. The sample is constructed
such that the mothersemployment and wage histories are observed from the beginning of their
working careers and include interruptions of work relating to rst births (parental leave). The
large sample of 30,000 women allows us to estimate the wage processes separately for education
groups and women who become mothers at some point in our observation period (the mother
sample) and women who remain childless (the non-mother sample). Hence, heterogeneity of
behaviour among women across the education distribution can be investigated. An additional
advantage of the data is that they cover an interesting period of family policy expansion in Ger-
many. During a relatively short period of time, parental leave was expanded from six months in
the period 1979 to 1986 to three years in 1992.3 The large variation over time makes Germanys
parental leave policy very suitable for our analysis.
While some studies have moved in the direction of controlling for complete work history
and sequence of events (e.g. Datta Gupta and Smith 2002; Nielsen et al. 2004), and allowing
for heterogeneity in the parameters across education groups (e.g. Anderson et al. 2002; Datta
3See Ondrich et al. (1996), Dustmann and Schönberg (2008) and Schönberg and Ludsteck (2007) for evidence
of the e¤ects of these reforms. However, none of these studies considers returning to work after childbirth and
relative changes over time, or indirect e¤ects on wage processes.
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Gupta and Smith 2002), no study has explicitly modelled post-childbirth xed e¤ects. This
study shows new evidence that mothers who return to full-time work are negatively selected,
and this holds across all education groups. This implies that standard estimates comparing
wages of women before childbirth with those they receive afterwards (rst di¤erence estimator)
overstate the causal e¤ect of interruption on a womans wages. While there has been some
evidence concerning return behaviour (e.g. Lalive and Zweimüller 2009; Burgess et al. 2008),
little is known about the randomness of this decision.
Institutions regarding the length of parental leave and childcare coverage vary greatly across
the OECD countries, and the e¤ect of the extension of parental leave is likely to depend on the
specic institutions.4 Therefore, our results may be informative concerning behaviour around
childbirth in countries with similar institutions such as the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal,
which are all characterized by relatively long durations of job-protected parental leave and low
provision of childcare for children aged 0 to 2 years. At the same time, Germany has one of
the largest family gaps (Harkness and Waldfogel 2003; Davies and Pierre 2005), which raises
questions about whether and how generous parental leave policies have a¤ected the labour
supply. In fact, previous evidence regarding full-time workers in West Germany suggests that
an important source of the family gap is the large drop in wages of around 1020 per cent per
year on returning to work following childbirth (Kunze 2002; Ondrich et al. 2003; Ejrnæs and
Kunze 2004; Schönberg and Ludsteck 2007; Beblo et al. 2009).
The main result in this study is that on return to full-time work after their rst births,
motherswages drop by 3 to 5.7 per cent per year of leave, and these estimates are smaller
than those from rst-di¤erence estimation. When we estimate our model in rst di¤erences
4It may be expected that e¤ects vary depending on whether leave periods are short or long (see Ruhm 1998)
and childcare coverage is high or low.
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using the control function approach, the estimates are lower because we nd negative selection
into the group returning to work after childbirth. This e¤ect becomes empirically important
because the return rate of mothers is only about 50 per cent. This means that those mothers
who actually return are those who are exposed to the greatest loss. This is plausible if, for
example, highly productive women also have highly productive partners, hence the marginal
utility of income is lower. We also nd that the return rates to full-time work decline across
our observation period, and therefore the e¤ect of negative selection, is aggravated over time.
This nding indicates that mothersposition in the labour market has not improved. It is
also noteworthy that our results relate to the e¤ects throughout the total period of leave after
the rst birth, rather than the cost per child related to leave. Finally, a comparison of the
predicted wage processes for mothers and women who remain childless shows sources of family
gap around birth.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the institutional
setting for Germany. Section III presents the econometric model. Section IV describes the data
and summary statistics. Section V presents the results and discusses the policy implications.
Section VI concludes.
II German parental leave legislation (1981 to 1996)
Women who gave birth between 1981 and the end of 1985 were eligible for six months of job-
protected maternity leave in Germany. These maternity leave provisions were regulated in the
maternity leave law (Mutterschutzgesetz) introduced in 1968. A main component of maternity
leave is that it guarantees the right to return to the previous position with the same employer
(job-protected maternity leave). The law gives working women the right to six weeks leave
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before the expected date of childbirth and eight weeks thereafter; meaning that working during
the eight weeks after giving birth is prohibited. The 14 weeks of leave are fully paid. Women
obtain compensation for income loss equivalent to the average wage for the three months before
the start of the protected leave period. Compensation is shared by health insurance, the federal
government and the employer. Since 1979, women have had access to an additional four months
of job-protected leave. However, this is unpaid in the sense that the only benets are paid by
the federal government and health insurance. From 1979 until 1985, benet payments from the
third month after giving birth were xed at a nominal level of 750 German marks (about 383
Euros); that is, about 20 to 30 per cent of average entry wages as observed in the IABS. These
have been subsequently reduced and eligibility rules have been introduced along with a number
of other changes.
Since 1985, maternity leave has been reformed several times. The 1986 reform was a major
change because it introduced longer parental leave but also extended rights to benet payments
to non-working mothers, and extended the right to parental leave to fathers.5 The main benet
of the parental leave reforms that this study exploits is the sequential extension of the periods
during which the right to return to the previous job (job-protected leave) can be used. By
1992, the job-protection period had been increased to three years after giving birth. For a full
overview, see Table 1. In the following, we refer to the complete period of job-protected leave
as (job-protected) parental leave.
[Table 1 about here]
5Mothers and fathers can now share parental leave from the third month after a childs birth. We do not
include this change, because it is rare for fathers to take parental leave: less than three per cent of fathers in
Germany in 1995 did so.
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In West Germany, childcare has traditionally been organized by public providers, only
part-time (that is 34 hours a day), and primarily for children aged 36 years, and this has
not changed very much during our period of interest. In 2001, less than 10 per cent on average
of all children aged 02 years were in childcare. In terms of length of parental leave and low
childcare coverage, West Germany is most similar to countries such as the Netherlands, Spain
and Portugal (OECD Employment Outlook, 2001).
It is an empirical question whether the extension of protected leave directly a¤ects the
decision to return to work after childbirth, and whether the e¤ect is positive or negative. In an
international study, Ruhm (1998) concluded that short leave durations have a positive impact
on employment while longer periods of leave have a negative e¤ect. Lalive and Zweimüller
(2009) found a decline in return rates in Austria when paid parental leave was extended from
one to two years. Other studies showed spikes around the time of expiry of paid and unpaid
leave; see Burgess et al. (2008) using British data and Schönberg and Ludsteck (2007) using
German data.
III The econometric framework
Our model to estimate wage processes around childbirth builds on a wage regression with
unobserved heterogeneity, as is standard in the literature, and is extended with post-birth
xed e¤ects. The standard part of the model includes a vector of observed human capital
characteristics, Xit, the duration of leave related to rst birth, mit, an unobserved individual-
specic component i and a time- and individual-varying shock, it. The individual-specic
e¤ect, i, captures the general unobserved ability or preference for work. The model allows for
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varying coe¢ cients before and after childbirth. In levels, it is written as:6




+ 1(t  tbirthi )Xitafter + 1(t  tbirthi )mit + 1(t  tbirthi )i
+ i + "it;
where 1() is an indicator function equal to one if the expression in parentheses holds and zero
otherwise. tbirth denotes the period in which the rst birth occurs. As an illustration, the model
is written here in terms of the key parameters,  (before and after rst birth) and , the e¤ect
through leave related to childbirth. A well-known challenge in the estimation of this model is
unobserved heterogeneity, i, and its correlation with mit (e.g. Waldfogel 1998a). This will be
taken into account by estimating equation (1) in rst di¤erences.7
As an extension of the standard model, the unobserved individual e¤ect can change after
giving birth; this is modelled by the post-birth individual-specic e¤ect i.
8 This is intended to
capture possible heterogeneity across mothers in changes in motivation, energy and commitment
in connection with childbirth. Thus, the impact of childbirth on womens wage processes
occurs through three channels: change in return to human capital (0s); the e¤ect of duration
6In the estimation, we ensure that the wage process is a continuous function of accumulated experience.
7Note that the estimated specication also controls for mobility (plant, occupation and sector) and time
e¤ects. Another minor extension that we introduce is that wages can increase at a declining rate, even before
childbirth. In a wage regression, conditional on being a mother, this can capture e¤ects through the timing of
birth. Hence, it may be that women with relatively slow career progression decide to have children.
8Note that  captures unobserved heterogeneity across individuals before and after giving birth. Hence, 
is essentially zero or equal to a constant before birth. It is only after giving birth that  becomes crucial. The
standard assumptions regarding individual xed e¤ects still apply: both  and  may be correlated with X
and m, and E() = E() = 0: Empirical estimation shows that relaxing these assumptions leaves the results
unchanged.
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of parental leave () that may capture depreciation of human capital and the change in the
individual-specic e¤ect related to childbirth (i).
We highlight two potential problems in estimating equation (1) by explicitly modelling i.
First, estimation in rst di¤erences does not remove i and a potential source of endogeneity
remains.9 Second, because not all women return to work after childbirth, we only observe wages
after giving birth for a selected group (a non-random sample). The selection problem arises
because E(ijsti = 1) 6= 0, where sti is an indicator of whether the woman returns to work after
childbirth and t indexes the period after giving birth when the woman returns. To deal with
these problems, we estimate the wage model in equation (1) in rst di¤erences and replace i
with a control function.
The control function is based on the following selection equation describing the return to
work after childbirth:
sti = 1(Zi(t)+Xi(t) + vi > 0); t = return (2)
where Zi(t) is a set of variables and vi is an error term assumed to be normally distributed. In
the empirical analysis, we focus on the period before and after the rst birth, and therefore
only one return decision for each woman is observed and Xi(t) and Zi(t) are measured before
this birth. We cannot estimate i, but only recover the covariance between i and vi. This
is su¢ cient to estimate the key parameters consistently. The identifying assumption is that if
we condition on v, then s and Z are exogenous to the wage process. Our approach is closely
related to Heckmans sample selection model, because the inverse Mills ratio is used as the
control function (see, for example, Blundell and Dias (2009)).
In this model, the endogeneity of the fertility decision is not considered explicitly. Note,
9In the rst-di¤erence model, i will not be swept out in the rst wage spell after childbirth.
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however, that we estimate the wage processes conditional on individual work history and xed
e¤ects. What we therefore assume is that the fertility decision conditioned on these characteris-
tics is exogenous. We acknowledge that this approach does not completely remove the problem,
yet it is very di¢ cult to nd valid instruments for fertility. To allow for more heterogeneity in
the wage processes, we estimate the wage model separately for mothers and non-mothers and
education groups.
To identify the post-childbirth parameters, we use changes in parental leave policy as a set
of exclusion restrictions. Women who became mothers during the period 1981 to 1985 were
eligible for 7.5 months of leave (the reference group). Women who gave birth after 1985 were
subject to the extensions of parental leave, and this generates the variation used to estimate
the e¤ect of the policy changes (see Table 1) on the return to work after giving birth. We
assume that the policies did not a¤ect the wage process either directly, through the selection
into motherhood, or through the timing of birth. The particular question for our application
is whether the policy changes have induced changes in the timing of the rst birth, because we
are only interested in the e¤ect through leave after the rst birth. Lalive and Zweimüller (2009)
have shown that the expansion of paid leave in Austria signicantly increased the likelihood of
second births. However, it is not obvious that this e¤ect extends to the timing of rst births in
the German context of unpaid leave and extremely low fertility. A caveat of our data is that
we do not observe the exact number of children and the birth of the second child. Therefore,
we cannot estimate the cost per child through leave, and we focus on the total e¤ect of leave
related to the rst birth.
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IV Data
We extract our sample from the two per cent IAB employment sample (IABS)10, which contains
the population of workers in Germany with at least one period of employment covered by social
security. This data source represents about 80 per cent of the total employment population in
Germany.11 These register data are of very high quality, because of the accuracy of data on
both wages (which are based on taxable income) and employment history. We apply the usual
adjustments to the data. For detailed descriptions of the data source, see Bender et al. (2000).
Data sample and variables
The sample contains cohorts of highly attached West German mothers who entered the
labour market between 1975 and 1994 and whose post-school work history was observed from
the start. The last period in which they can be observed is 2001. We dene highly attached
mothers as those who have never worked part-time before birth and who have worked for at
least one year full-time until giving birth.12 We keep women who were on job-protected leave
during the period 19811995 but no later to ensure that we can follow them for a su¢ ciently long
period after childbirth (ve years). This also implies that everybody was eligible for at least 7:5
months of parental leave (including maternity leave of 14 weeks). Only for returners are wages
used after childbirth. We focus on wage outcomes for those returning to full-time work within
3.5 years. We chose this duration as the cut-o¤ point so as to have enough returners within
10IABS is an abbreviation for the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung Sample.
11Not included are civil servants, the self-employed, students, unpaid family workers and people who are not
eligible for benets from the social security system.
12By construction, we exclude from our sample those who did not start work in a job covered by the social
security system after completing their education, and have never been in full-time work. Furthermore, we
exclude those who began work after completing their education and dropped out to non-work or part-time work
before having a child.
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every year and education group.13 Non-returners are those not remaining highly attached to
the labour market and include those who switch to part-time work or drop out of work. We
use only those periods until the second interruption reported in the data. This is to focus on
the e¤ects around rst births through rst parental leave.14 For the counterfactual analysis, we
retain in the sample women for whom no interruption is observed during their labour career
and who are still childless by the age of 39 years (the non-mothers sample).15 Finally, we
distinguish between three education groups: low skilled (10 years of compulsory schooling and
less than 1.5 years of vocational training or college), medium skilled (10 years of schooling and
an apprenticeship) and high skilled (12 or 13 years of schooling with a 34-year technical college
degree, or a 46-year university degree). To generate complete work histories from rst entry
into work, we require that the low- and medium-skilled women were no older than 16 years of
age in 1975 and the high-skilled women were no older than 23 years of age in 1975.
In our analyses, the main variables are the log of real daily wages16 for full-time work (more
than 35 hours a week), work experience and the leave duration relating to the rst childbirth.
The duration of leave is dened as the sum of the total length of work interruption relating to
the rst birth (parental leave) and extended non-working periods immediately following. As
we estimate the model in rst di¤erences, we use indicator variables for change of occupation
13Formally, we wish to use the longest period of protected leave throughout the observation window, which
is 37.5 months. In our empirical implementation, we slightly extend this period to 42 months. Our denition
of the cut-o¤ point is important for the rst stage of the estimator. In the second stage, the actual duration is
used. We have modied the cut-o¤ point to test robustness, and results were not a¤ected.
14This is to ensure the best quality of the parental leave variable. See Schönberg (2009) for a discussion.
15We acknowledge that some of these women may have children later than 39, or had given birth before entry
at a very young age.
16All wages are measured in Deutsche marks (DM). After 1998, Euros are converted into DM at the exchange
rate of 1 Euro = 1.9553 DM. Wages are deated by the Consumer Price Index, with 1995 as the base year.
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based on three-digit occupation groups, change of sector based on 12 sector groups and changes
of plant. Our instrumental variables for changes in parental leave duration are determined by
the month and year of reforms.
Descriptive statistics
The summary statistics of the mother and non-mother samples are presented in Table 2.
We can see that age at rst birth is 25 for low-skilled mothers and increases as education level
increases. This corresponds to 5:6 years of work experience for the low-skilled mothers, and
4:8 years for high-skilled mothers at rst birth. Entry wages di¤er considerably between the
skill groups, showing the importance of entry conditions. Wage levels during their careers also
increase with education and experience. In addition, 1619 per cent per year of workers change
plant, and around 10 per cent per year change occupation.
[Table 2 about here]
The descriptive statistics show two main ndings. First, we nd low return rates among
mothers. On average, only 50 per cent of mothers return to full-time employment, even within
3.5 years after giving birth.17 Second, the returning wage levels are some 510 per cent lower in
real terms immediately after giving birth than in the last period before birth. Taken together,
this raises the question of whether the wage drop is purely due to heterogeneity, or whether it
is because the group of returning mothers is a selected group.
The data also reect typical ndings that returns to experience, or wage growth, are rel-
atively large early in careers and declining thereafter, as is mobility. Comparing mothers and
non-mothers shows that entry wages for mothers are signicantly lower than for non-mothers,
17Approximately one-fourth of the mothers return to part-time work.
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but the di¤erences are not very substantial, being only 37 per cent lower.18
[Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 depicts changes in the distribution of completed leave duration throughout the
reforms. The gure reveals spikes around the time of expiry of protected parental leave. The
proportion of women not returning to full-time employment increased from 3237 per cent in
198185 to 5056 per cent from 1992. These patterns hold across the three education groups.
Hence, despite the reforms making return to employment more attractive because a similar
position was guaranteed, the actual return-to-work rate has declined (at least within the 3.5
years we regard as the medium run).
In the econometric analysis, we take into account general trends in the pattern of return to
work and use the within-year variation induced by the reforms for identication. The variation
we exploit can be illustrated by the reforms in January 1986 and July 1989. The lower part
of Table 3 reports that those women giving birth in the second half of 1989 (and commencing
leave six weeks before the expected birth date) had a 26 percentage point lower probability
of returning to work than those who gave birth in the rst half of 1989. While the variation is
smaller in the years when the reform occurred on 1 January, for example in 1986, we can still
exploit this e¤ect because the period of leave commenced before childbirth.
[Table 3 about here]
V Results
Estimation results
18In the US, Lundberg and Rose (2000) found a di¤erence of 9 per cent on average across all education groups.
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We estimate the model in equation (1) by rst-di¤erence estimation separately for the low-,
medium- and high-skilled mothers and correct for the non-random decision to return to work
after childbirth. In the rst-stage probit regression in Table 4, in addition to the ve dummy
variables for the policy changes dened by month and year, we include exogenous variables
from the wage equation in rst di¤erences; that is, changes in individual characteristics and
the time dummies. All explanatory variables are measured in the last spell of employment
before childbirth. Our estimation results show very clearly that conditional on the controls, the
reforms decrease the probability of returning to full-time employment for all education groups.
Tests for joint signicance of all the dummy variables for policy changes show that they are
highly signicant for all three education groups. Based on the probit estimation, we generate
the control function (the inverse Mills ratio) and add it to our main wage regressions in rst
di¤erences.
[Table 4 and 5 about here]
The estimation results from the control function approach are reported in Table 5. The
return to experience during early career and before birth is quite high. It is greatest for low-
skilled mothers and lowest for high-skilled mothers, 8:9 per cent and 4:0 per cent, respectively,
for an increase from 3 to 4 years of experience. An additional non-linear e¤ect works through
the time e¤ects three years before birth that we allow for in the estimated wage model. This
shows that even before childbirth, wage growth starts to decline, except for the high-skilled
mothers. Across all education groups, returns to experience decrease substantially after giving
birth to around 2:6 per cent (low-skilled mothers) and 2:1 per cent (high-skilled mothers) when
experience increases from 3 to 4 years.
Extended parental leave in connection with childbirth leads to a signicant wage decline
14
in all education groups. For the medium skilled, the fall is 5:8 per cent per year in real
wages. It is somewhat lower for the high-skilled, only 4:4: per cent per year, but this is less
precisely estimated. It is lowest for low-skilled mothers, at only 3:4 per cent per year. The
di¤erences are only statistically signicant between low- and medium-skilled mothers. The test
for homogeneity across education groups is, however, rejected (See Table 5). It is interesting to
note that while these are not negligible values, the estimated falls in real wages are smaller than
those from simple rst-di¤erence estimates; for the estimation results, see Table 6.19 The fact
that rst-di¤erence estimation yields smaller e¤ects than previous studies may be because the
e¤ects are estimated separately by education group and account for more heterogeneity than
in other studies. Interestingly, the estimated e¤ects decrease further once we control for non-
randomness in the return process. Hence, the estimated e¤ect for rst-di¤erence estimation is
a composite e¤ect. Simple calculations show that selection accounts for 40 per cent of the rst-
di¤erence estimate of the e¤ect through leave duration for the low skilled. The corresponding
gures are 60 per cent for the medium skilled and 53 per cent for the high skilled. We regard
the remaining e¤ect as human capital depreciation.20
While other controls for mobility have economically plausible signs, interpretation is com-
plicated because mobility may still be endogenous. The average e¤ect of mobility during the
entire period of observation is positive, particularly for plant mobility. In connection with return
to work after giving birth, we nd negative e¤ects. For the low-skilled mothers the estimate is
 7:5 per cent (= 5:3  12:8) and for medium-skilled mothers  2:2 per cent (= 5:4  7:6). It is
19These estimates are also smaller than ndings from previous studies. See Beblo et al. (2009) and Schönberg
et al. (2007). Both studies focus on full-time working women.
20As shown in a previous study using GSOEP data, we cannot rule out the possibility that part of this gap
is explained by the loss of bonus payments and other fringe benets. See Ejrnæs and Kunze (2004, p. 43).
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not signicant for the high-skilled.
[Figure 2 here]
In Table 5 we can see that the estimated coe¢ cient for the control function is highly
signicant and negative for all three education groups. This reects negative selection back
to full-time employment among mothers. To illustrate the operation of negative selection, in
Figure 2 we depict the predicted wage prole for a medium-skilled woman giving birth in 1990
who actually returned to full-time employment after a year of leave. We nd that this woman,
compared with the averagemother21, experiences a much larger drop in wages around the
rst childbirth. This implies that ignoring the selection process back to full-time employment
will lead to an overestimation of the mean drop in wages in connection with childbirth. A
comparison between the education groups shows that negative selection is less pronounced for
the low skilled and more pronounced for the medium and high skilled.22
In Figure 2, we compare the same womans wages to the hypothetical wages that she would
have experienced without giving birth; that is, if she were to postpone rst childbirth to very
late, here 1999.23 Then, we see a gain from postponement, primarily because the returns are
highest early in careers, and already begin to decrease before childbirth.
To illustrate the di¤erences between wage processes for mothers and non-mothers, we also
plot the predicted wage processes for a medium-skilled non-mother in Figure 2.24 As shown,
non-mothers have a slightly higher entry wage but a lower return to experience in the beginning
21The averagemother is dened as a woman who has i equal to 0; whereas the mother that returns has
i equal to E(ijsti = 1):
22The gures for the low- and high-skilled mothers are available from the authors upon request.
23We chose as an example the postponement of rst childbirth to 1999 because from then until 1995 the
prole is purely based on the estimated return to experience before childbirth.
24The complete results for the non-mother samples are available on request.
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of their labour market career. However, the average return to experience after giving birth (for
those women having children) is much lower than before birth, and is also low when compared to
non-mothers. The comparison reveals four sources of family gap for those who have children:
the wage level of mothers is comparably low at rst entry (see Table 2); wage growth rates
decrease immediately before birth; mothers fall behind because of a wage decline on return
after leave; and their return to experience is relatively low after giving birth.
Discussion
The result that those who return to work are negatively selected may be surprising. This
result holds within each education group. It is consistent with a number of economic expla-
nations. Our data, however, are too limited to pinpoint which of these best ts the data.
Negative selection can, for example, arise because of assortative matching. If highly productive
women are married to highly productive men with high earnings, these women can work less
and therefore the negative selection is driven by an income e¤ect. The negative selection could
also be generated by specialization in work after giving birth and by purchasing childcare. This
outcome can be derived in a model extending Becker s (1985) one-period model to a two-
period one (before and after rst childbirth) where the e¤ort intensity of household production
increases after giving birth. In this case, wages will decline after giving birth because more
e¤ort is devoted to housework. The nding may also capture that highly productive women
choose to space their births closer and therefore do not return to work within 3.5 years.25 Other
explanations could follow from a backward-bending labour supply curve.
Negative selection is also interesting from a policy perspective. As we have seen, negative
selection implies a tendency to overestimate the mean loss from childbirth if this aspect is
25Kreyenfeld (2002) showed for West Germany that approximately 50 per cent of all mothers born between
1961 and 1963 had a second birth within 3.5 years.
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ignored. This is important if employers form their expectations about the productivity losses
of mothers on the basis of their observations (which means the performance of women who
actually returned). Employers then overestimate the losses, and this means that if an average
mother decides to return, she would actually be paid too low a wage because of statistical
discrimination.
[Figure 3 here]
To illustrate this aspect, we compare the impact of the reforms during the late 1980s.
In Figure 3, we plot the predicted wage paths for a medium-skilled woman giving birth in
1981 and the same hypothetical woman giving birth in 1990. The wage prole of the average
mother is not a¤ected by the reforms, but if we only look at those who actually return, the
drop in wages becomes much larger for the woman giving birth in 1990 compared to the same
woman giving birth in 1981. The expansion of parental leave has the e¤ect that the proportion
of mothers returning to full-time employment declines, and this leads to an indirect e¤ect
on those mothers who do return because they are more exposed to statistical discrimination.
These indirect e¤ects of parental leave schemes on labour supply are important for the design
of parental leave schemes, because this mechanism induces less productive mothers to return.
Our results focus on the wage processes of women who remain highly attached to the
labour market; that is, those who return to a full-time career after birth, which amounts to an
important and large group of women. A concern in generalizing results is that the denition of
highly attached may be restrictive, primarily because it does not include those who temporarily
switch to part-time work and then return to full-time work. While the IABS data are too limited
to make wages from full-time work and part-time work comparable, we argue that inclusion of
wages from part-time work would not change our main results on negative selection. It may
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be that the most productive women temporarily transit into part-time work. However, even if
this were the case our results will still show that there exists a potential to increase the labour
force by adding women who are on average more productive. In this case this may be done
by encouraging mothers in part-time work to return to full-time employment. The size of the
potential increase in the labour force will of course depend on how many of and how fast these
women in part-time work return to full-time work.
VI Concluding remarks
In this study, we analysed womens wage processes for Germany with a particular focus on
the period around rst childbirth. We found that the selection process of return to work and
the wage process around childbirth are strongly related. The results also indicate negative
selection; i.e., mothers who su¤er relatively large wage losses in connection with childbirth
are more likely to return to full-time employment after giving birth. Womens wages are
negatively a¤ected by the duration of leave relating to childbirth. Furthermore, the return to
experience is lower after childbirth than before, and lower for mothers than for non-mothers.
Comparisons across education groups reveal considerable heterogeneity. Finally, we document
that the wage processes of women who become mothers and those who remain childless develop
very di¤erently, despite small di¤erences at labour market entry.
Our results contrast with previous ndings for Germany that have shown large declines
by international standards in wages after giving birth for women in full-time work (Schönberg
et al. 2007; Beblo et al. 2008). Our ndings suggest that estimates conditional on returning
to work underestimate the average productivity of women with young children. Furthermore,
our results demonstrate that the expansionary parental leave policy did not create incentives
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for highly productive mothers to return to work. These ndings have important implications.
First, expansionary reforms between 1985 and 1995 have prevented the improvement of mothers
positions in the labour market. Two indicators of this are the decline in the rate of return to
full-time work across this period and the increase in the average duration of leave. Second, given
that mothers who return to work relatively shortly after childbirth are a negatively selected
group, rms may have excessively low expectations about the mean productivity of all mothers.
A question following from our analysis is whether non-random selection back to work is
generally of importance for studies of the wage changes of women around childbirth and the
family gap. One argument supporting the view that this is potentially a more general issue is
that the employment rates of women with young children are lower than for women overall in
many countries. The result of negative selection may arguably be important for countries with
parental leave and childcare institutions similar to those in Germany. In addition, the career
changes of women after giving birth are widely observed, and a question is what proportion
of women return to their pre-birth (highly attached) prole. Only detailed analyses of large
longitudinal micro data can reveal such compositional changes. We consider these questions of
broad interest for future research.
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Table 1: Parental leave durations between 1979 and 2001
Job-protected leave
Children Maternity Parental Total protected leave Hours
born between.. leavea leave [benet eligibility] , before and after of
paid month 3 plus after birth birth part-time
per weekb
1.7.1979-31.12.1985 1.5+2 months 4 months [4 months] 7.5 months
1.1.1986-31.12.1987 1.5+2 months 8 months [8 months] 11.5 months 15
1.1.1988-30.6.1989 1.5+2 months 10 months [10 months] 13.5 months 15
1.7.1989-30.6.1990 1.5+2 months 13 months [13 months] 16.5 months 19
1.7.1990-31.12.1991 1.5+2 months 16 months [16 months] 19.5 months 19
1.1.1992-31.12.1992 1.5+2 months 34 months [16 months] 37.5 months 19
1.1.1993-30.12.2000 1.5+2 months 34 months [22 months] 37.5 months 19
Notes: aMaternity leave is fully paid based on average wage during the three months before birth.
b These are the number of hours one is allowed to work while on leave.
Sources: Mutterschutzgesetz 25.06.1979,

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: The return rate of mothers going on parental leave in 1985 and 1989
Leave starts Appr. date of Max. leave Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled
rst birth (months) no obs pct no obs pct no obs pct
1.1-31.10.1985 1.3-31.12 1985 7.5 564 64.18 920 64.35 53 67.92
1.1131.12.1985 1.1-28.2 1986 11.5 39 58.97 53 49.06 3 66.67
Test for no di¤erence 2(1) (p  value) 0:42 (p = 0:51) 5:05 (p = 0:03) 0:01 (p = 0:96)
1.1-30.4.1989 1.1 -30.6 1989 13.5 283 49.47 538 48.33 39 56.41
1.5-31.12.1989 1.7-31.12 1989 16.5 419 47.73 732 43.31 38 50.00
Test for no di¤erence 2(1) (p  value) 0:20 (p = 0:65) 3:15 (p = 0:08) 0:31 (p = 0:58)
Notes: IABS 19752001, sample of highly attached mothers.
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]Table 4: Selection equation: return or not return to full-time work after birth
decision estimated by a probit model
Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled
coef. s.e. coef. s.e. coef. s.e.
Experience (yrs) .074 (.072) -.057 (.052) -.133 (.214)
Experience (yrs)2 -.013 (.002) -.006 (.002) -0.009 (.008)
Plant change .041 (.068) .107 (.046) .643 (.200)
Occupation change .036 (.073) .156 (.056) .190 (.248)
Protected leave in months (period)
Leave=10 (1/1986-12/1987) -.125 (.121) -.135 (.090) -.809 (.437)
Leave=12 (1/1988-6/1989) -.220 (.123) -.329 (.090) -.867 (.417)
Leave=15 (7/19896/1990) -.420 (.128) -.607 (.092) -.995 (.418)
Leave=18 (7/199012/1991) -.523 (.128) -.705 (.091) -1.284 (.394)
Leave=36 ( 1/1992-12/1995) -.759 (.138) -.654 (.091) -1.034 (.367)
Number of observations 8,969 16,342 1,113
Pseudo R-squared 0.028 0.022 0.044
Test for joint signicance of the leave duration variables
Test statistic 2(5) 36.95 (p=0.00) 92.49 (p=0.00) 11.74 (p=0.04)
Notes: IABS 19752001, sample of highly attached mothers.
Other controls are included for year and industry.
***,**,* indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively
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Table 5: Estimation results of the wage regression in rst di¤erences (control func-
tion approach) for the mothers sample
Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled
coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.)
Variables before rst birth
Experience (yrs) .138 (.003) .109 (.002) .065 (.008)
Experience (yrs)2 -.007 (.001) -.006 (.000) -.004 (.001)
Dummy for 3 years before -.013 (.001) -.010 (.001) .007 (.005)
Variables in connection with rst birth
Duration of leave (yrs) .034 (.007) -.058 (.006) -.044 (.023)
Plant change(mat. leave) -.128 (.018) -.076 (.012) .049 (.051)
Occupation change(mat.leave) .021 (.030) -.005 (.016) -0.08 (.069)
Variables after rst birth
Experience (yrs) .024 (.003) .026 (.004) .026 (.025)
Experience (yrs)2 .0004 (.0001) -.000 (.0002) -.001 (.001)
Other controls
Plant change .053 (.003) .054 (.001) .031 (.001)
Occupation change .008 (.004) .012 (.002) .040 (.012)
Inverse Mills ratio -.046 (.010) -.082 (.008) -.084 (.034)
Number of observations 75,982 132,873 8,474
Number of individuals 8,969 16,342 1,113
R-squared 0.154 0.166 0.110
Test for educational homogeneity
Test statistic 2(92) 343.66 p-value 0.00
Notes: IABS 19752001, sample of highly attached mothers.
Other controls are included for year and industry.
***,**,* indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively
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Table 6: Estimation results of the wage regression in rst di¤erences for the mothers
sample
Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled
coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.) coef. (s.e.)
Variables before rst birth
Experience (yrs) .137 (.003) .108 (.002) .064 (.008)
Experience (yrs)2 -.007 (.001) -.006 (.000) -.004 (.001)
Dummy for 3 years before -.013 (.001) -.010 (.001) .007 (.005)
Variables in connection with rst birth
Duration of leave (yrs) .055 (.005) -.096 (.004) -.083 (.018)
Plant change(mat. leave) -.130 (.019) -.086 (.012) .040 (.051)
Occ. change(mat.leave) .021 (.020) -.005 (.016) -.096 (.068)
Variables after rst birth
Experience (yrs) .019 (.003) .014 (.004) .022 (.025)
Experience (yrs)2 .0004 (.0001) -.000 (.000) -.001 (.001)
Other controls
Plant change .053 (.003) .054 (.002) .032 (.010)
Occupation change .008 (.004) .012 (.002) .039 (.012)
Number of observations 75,982 132,873 8,474
Number of individuals 8,969 16,342 1,113
R-squared 0.153 0.164 0.108
Test for educational homogeneity
Test statistic 2(90) 336.50 p-value 0.00
Notes: IABS 19752001, sample of highly attached mothers.
Other controls are included for year and industry.
***,**,* indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively
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Figure 1: The distribution of actual leave, by education groups
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Figure 2: The predicted wage proles for medium-skilled women
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Figure 3: The predicted wage proles for medium-skilled mothers giving birth
in 1981 and 1990
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